The outer London Defence ring was a defensive ring built around London during the early part of the Second World War. It was intended as a defence against a German invasion, and was part of a national network of similar "Stop Lines".
In June 1940 under the direction of General Ironside concentric rings of anti-tank defences and pillboxes were constructed in and around London. They comprised: The London Inner Keep, London Stop Line Inner (Line C), London Stop Line Central (Line B) and London Stop Line Outer (Line A). The Outer London Ring was the strongest and best developed of these, mainly because it could be constructed in open countryside. Work on all the lines was halted weeks later by Ironside's successor, General Alan Brooke who favoured mobile warfare above static defence.
The ring used a mixture of natural rivers and artificial ditches up to 20 feet (6 m) wide and 12 feet (4 m) deep, encircling London completely.
North of London the ring followed a path similar to the route now taken by the M25, fromWatford, following the River Colne, through Potters Bar, Cuffley, Nazeing, then running south through Epping Forest, Loughton and Chigwell. Many pillboxes and anti tank traps are still visible at points along the ring, but in the majority of places the ditch is no longer visible, covered by the M25 or London suburbs.
On 14 May 1940, Secretary of State for War Anthony Eden announced the creation of the Local Defence Volunteers (LDV)—later to become known as the Home Guard. Far more men volunteered than the government expected and by the end of June, there were nearly 1.5 million volunteers. There were plenty of personnel for the defence of the country, but there were no uniforms (a simple armband had to suffice) and equipment was in critically short supply. At first, the Home Guard was armed with guns in private ownership, a knife or bayonet on a pole,Molotov Cocktails and improvised flame-throwers.
A measure of mobility was provided by bicycles, motorcycles, private vehicles and horses. A small number of units were equipped with armoured cars, some of which were of standard design, but many were improvised locally from commercially available vehicles by the attachment of steel plates.
Military thinking shifted rapidly. Given the lack of equipment and properly trained men, Ironside had had little choice but to adopt a strategy of static warfare, but it was soon perceived that this would not be sufficient. Ironside has been criticised for having a siege mentality, but some consider this unfair, as he is believed to have understood the limits of the stop lines and never expected them to hold out indefinitely.
However, Prime Minister Churchill was not satisfied with Ironside's progress, especially with regard to the creation of a mobile reserve. Anthony Eden, the Secretary of State for War, suggested that Ironside should be replaced by General Brooke(later Viscount). On 17 July 1940 Churchill spent an afternoon with Brooke and was soon convinced that they were in close agreement as to how best to defend the nation. On 19 July Brooke replaced Ironside.
Brooke's appointment coincided with more trained men and better equipment becoming available. Under Brooke, new strategies and tactics were devised. More concentration was placed on defending the coastal crust, while inland a hedgehog defence strategy of defended localities and anti-tank islands was established, each having all-round defence. Many of these anti-tank islands were established along the already constructed stop lines, where existing defences could be integrated into the new strategy and, especially, at towns and villages where there was a Home Guard to provide personnel.
In battle, the Home Guard were to hold or delay the enemy on the beaches or on inland defensive lines, while regular troops, released from static defences into mobile columns, would counter-attack.
The Home Guard defences were an important part of the defensive scheme.
The Home Guard in Hertfordshire played their part in these duties to the full. Within a week of Eden’s appeal six thousand men had volunteered in the county, more than there were rifles available; they included a retired Field Marshal from Wheathampstead. Initially, the county’s L.D.V. were organised as a battalion of twenty companies (each on average at least 300 strong) with their headquarters in the towns and larger villages, although one was raised entirely from the staff of the De Havilland Aircraft Company in Hatfield. As the number of volunteers mounted, more companies were formed which were ultimately grouped into fifteen battalions. The Home Guard was formally stood down by the end of 1944 and disbanded a year later.
The Pillbox
In the countryside camouflage was provided by camouflage pattern paint, camouflage nets or making them blend in with surroundings by e.g. by disguising them as haystacks. Many had turf laid on the roof to try and hide them from aerial observation. A letter from the General Staff, 55th Div (front line Division, Suffolk, 1940) to its Brigade Commanders notes that many pillboxes had been painted too brightly to fit in with surroundings!
Maj Gen Majendie, Commander 55th Div notes(Aug 1940): “ I am very much afraid we have gone pill-box mad, and losing all sense of proportion in sighting defences…..The countryside is covered with pill-boxes, many of which will never be occupied, many could never serve any useful purpose, and many face the wrong way”. This may have well been in response to a visit to Eastern Command by Gen Brooke in July , in which he noted in his diary his concern about the amount of resources committed in constructing a rear defence line comprising of pillboxes and anti-tank ditches (the Corps Line) and the fact there would never be sufficient Field Forces to man the line. Maj Gen Majendie does state that this state of affairs had come about “due to haste and the desire to get something done quickly”.
By 1942 pillboxes had completely fallen out of favour. A letter (23rd Feb 1942) from GHQ Home Forces to the Commands noted “all experience of modern warfare….points most strongly to the fact that the pillbox is not a suitable type of fortification for either coastal or nodal point defences”. The letter also noted that the Commander In Chief has directed that in future field defences would consist of well constructed and concealed earthworks. It was noted that many pillboxes occupied the best firing position – in this case they could remain part of the defence although alternative field works should be provided.
In conclusion, it would appear that pillboxes were constructed in a somewhat haphazard manor in order to ‘get the job done’. The concept of stop lines and concrete defences would seem to have given the impression that Britain’s defences had reverted to the linear line defence of the First War. However there is no evidence to suggest that Command expected the Corps Line or any other stop line to be held in the manor of First War defences – the principal role was to delay the enemy until counter attack reserves could be brought forward. There is perhaps some contradiction in GHQ’s views in the worth of pillboxes given the amount of training from 1942 onwards that was devoted to overcoming similar German defences consisting of mutually supporting defences of pillboxes and earthworks. The US Intelligence Service certainly did not underestimate the value of permanent fortifications: “The Germans well understand that fortifications are truly offensive in character when their employment is based on the military maxim of economy of force. They cannot defend adequately at all points, but by the use of permanent fortifications to maintain an effective defense with a minimum of man power, they hope to keep the bulk of their force in reserve for offensive action”.
Pillboxes where usually constructed with two pouring of concrete. The first pouring was up to the base of the embrasures. Pre-cast embrasures were then added along with the seconded pouring. The concrete was reinforced with steel rods. Due to a shortage of timber, bricks or concrete blocks were often used as shuttering. This has led to a common misunderstanding that many pillboxes were only built of brick! Where the shuttering has been removed, the two pouring of concrete often show up as a fault line. In this instance LBC (London Brick Company) bricks were used for the shuttering.
Set along field boundary NW of Appleby Street Farm. 15 anti-tank blocks. Line of anti-tank blocks (at least eight) positioned side by side along hedgerow. 7 blocks cast using corrugated iron shuttering. Probably ex-situ. Viewed from a distance. There is no access to this site without permission.
In June 1940 under the direction of General Ironside concentric rings of anti-tank defences and pillboxes were constructed in and around London. They comprised: The London Inner Keep, London Stop Line Inner (Line C), London Stop Line Central (Line B) and London Stop Line Outer (Line A). The Outer London Ring was the strongest and best developed of these, mainly because it could be constructed in open countryside. Work on all the lines was halted weeks later by Ironside's successor, General Alan Brooke who favoured mobile warfare above static defence.
The ring used a mixture of natural rivers and artificial ditches up to 20 feet (6 m) wide and 12 feet (4 m) deep, encircling London completely.
North of London the ring followed a path similar to the route now taken by the M25, fromWatford, following the River Colne, through Potters Bar, Cuffley, Nazeing, then running south through Epping Forest, Loughton and Chigwell. Many pillboxes and anti tank traps are still visible at points along the ring, but in the majority of places the ditch is no longer visible, covered by the M25 or London suburbs.
The Fall of Dunkirque May 1940, and the Home Guard
By July 1940 the situation had improved somewhat with uniforms, a modicum of training and the arrival of hundreds of thousands of rifles and millions of rounds of ammunition from the USA. New weapons were developed that could be produced cheaply without consuming materials that were needed to produce armaments for the regular units. An early example was the No 76 Special Incendiary Grenade (a glass bottle filled with highly flammable material of which more than six million were made)and the number 73 grenade (an anti-tank grenade resembling a Thermos flask).
Brooke's appointment coincided with more trained men and better equipment becoming available. Under Brooke, new strategies and tactics were devised. More concentration was placed on defending the coastal crust, while inland a hedgehog defence strategy of defended localities and anti-tank islands was established, each having all-round defence. Many of these anti-tank islands were established along the already constructed stop lines, where existing defences could be integrated into the new strategy and, especially, at towns and villages where there was a Home Guard to provide personnel.
The Home Guard defences were an important part of the defensive scheme.
The actual area and line of defences covered in this report is only a small section of what is located in the area surrounding Cuffley. Mostly placed behind and around Cuffley the connecting defences run in a sweeping arc behind a housing estate and connects up with the defences of Cheshunt Lake and the Canal. The explore was made all the more difficult due to the farm land, location of some of the pillboxes and the ground that needed to be covered.
firstly the really easy part.
Outer Defence Ring - Line A
Outer Defence Ring - Line A
ANTI TANK BLOCK: S0005053
At the foot of Darnicle Hill on both sides of railway bridge, E of Newgate Street.
1. row of 18 x cubes parallel to road, E of bridge N of road. 2. row of 16 x cubes between stream and bridge. 3. under bridge, row of 5 x cubes parallel with road. 4. 2 x cubes (one much wider than the norm), under bridge S side of road. 5. row of 43 x cubes, from bridge abutment curving S along foot of railway embankment as far as stream. 6. row of 4 x cubes at right angles to 5. above, connecting them to brick culvert under railway embankment 1. row of 18 x cubes parallel to road, E of bridge N of road. 2. row of 16 x cubes between stream and bridge. 3. under bridge, row of 5 x cubes parallel with road. 4. 2 x cubes (one much wider than the norm), under bridge S side of road. 5. row of 43 x cubes, from bridge abutment curving S along foot of railway embankment as far as stream. 6. row of 4 x cubes at right angles to 5. above, connecting them to brick culvert under railway embankment.
The opposite side of the road utilises the span of the bridge as part of what would have been a roadblock, the run of AT blocks then carries on past and alongside the bridge forming a protective barrier to the rail-track. Combined with the roadblocks and pilboxes slightly further down the road, this section would have provided a sufficient stalling area for reinforcements to be called in.
The Pillbox
In the countryside camouflage was provided by camouflage pattern paint, camouflage nets or making them blend in with surroundings by e.g. by disguising them as haystacks. Many had turf laid on the roof to try and hide them from aerial observation. A letter from the General Staff, 55th Div (front line Division, Suffolk, 1940) to its Brigade Commanders notes that many pillboxes had been painted too brightly to fit in with surroundings!
Not surprisingly such a rapid construction programme was not without problems. From the records of the time it would appear many pillboxes were constructed without the supervision of the Royal Engineers – both in the location and materials used in construction.
Lt. Col Ovey D.S.O (Commander 7th Bttn Suffolk Home Guard) noted that in July 1940, “Pillboxes began to spring up mainly at road junctions and crossroads often in most visible and vulnerable positions…………I have no idea who was responsible for their sighting as no reference was ever made to the local Home Guard Commanders or as far as I know to any regular military Commander”.
The pillbox had one serious flaw in a defence based around mutually supporting section posts with all round fields of fire. With a section post usually comprising of six men, only two at a time could fire in any given direction (unless in the unlikely event that the post was under attack from all directions at once) with the rest of the garrison taking no part in the defence. They were also vulnerable to isolation by smoke and gas. Instructions were now issued that if pillboxes were still to form part of a section post they were to be regarded as a keep where the garrison could take cover if under air attack. As soon as the attack was over or the enemy troops appeared d the garrison was to leave the pillbox and fight in trenches sited for all round defence, the key point that the entire section’s weapons could be fired in any one direction. The light machine gun could fire from the pillbox if it could carry out its role otherwise it should come out to a prepared position.
Having said all this, a memo from GHQ dated October 1940 noted that “For defence against invasion concrete works often have many advantages over field works. Many defences are in places much exposed to the weather; others must be left ready for occupation in places where few or no troops are normally stationed, and where maintenance is consequently difficult. Many have to be erected near or among buildings, where a concrete structure is less conspicuous and more easily camouflaged than an earthwork”“
In 1941 a policy was put in place to deny to the enemy redundant pillboxes. This was to be achieved by filling pillboxes with barbed wire and blocking up loopholes. In Suffolk, 15th Div issued instructions that redundant pillboxes in forward areas were to be wired up with booby traps placed inside – these were to be marked with a white cross. In rear areas they were to be wired up with dummy booby traps placed inside and marked with a red cross. If cement was available loopholes were to be blocked. This policy did not apply to stop lines and nodal points were the defences were to be maintained.
Having said all this, a memo from GHQ dated October 1940 noted that “For defence against invasion concrete works often have many advantages over field works. Many defences are in places much exposed to the weather; others must be left ready for occupation in places where few or no troops are normally stationed, and where maintenance is consequently difficult. Many have to be erected near or among buildings, where a concrete structure is less conspicuous and more easily camouflaged than an earthwork”“
In 1941 a policy was put in place to deny to the enemy redundant pillboxes. This was to be achieved by filling pillboxes with barbed wire and blocking up loopholes. In Suffolk, 15th Div issued instructions that redundant pillboxes in forward areas were to be wired up with booby traps placed inside – these were to be marked with a white cross. In rear areas they were to be wired up with dummy booby traps placed inside and marked with a red cross. If cement was available loopholes were to be blocked. This policy did not apply to stop lines and nodal points were the defences were to be maintained.
In conclusion, it would appear that pillboxes were constructed in a somewhat haphazard manor in order to ‘get the job done’. The concept of stop lines and concrete defences would seem to have given the impression that Britain’s defences had reverted to the linear line defence of the First War. However there is no evidence to suggest that Command expected the Corps Line or any other stop line to be held in the manor of First War defences – the principal role was to delay the enemy until counter attack reserves could be brought forward. There is perhaps some contradiction in GHQ’s views in the worth of pillboxes given the amount of training from 1942 onwards that was devoted to overcoming similar German defences consisting of mutually supporting defences of pillboxes and earthworks. The US Intelligence Service certainly did not underestimate the value of permanent fortifications: “The Germans well understand that fortifications are truly offensive in character when their employment is based on the military maxim of economy of force. They cannot defend adequately at all points, but by the use of permanent fortifications to maintain an effective defense with a minimum of man power, they hope to keep the bulk of their force in reserve for offensive action”.
Platoon tactics in attacking a pillbox- Infantry Training Part VIII 1944
PILLBOX (TYPE FW3/22): S0005056
Sat to the rear of a housing estate and initially very difficult to find. Located low in the hedge-line close to a barbed wire fence. Cheshunt. The brick shuttering is still evident.
Pillboxes where usually constructed with two pouring of concrete. The first pouring was up to the base of the embrasures. Pre-cast embrasures were then added along with the seconded pouring. The concrete was reinforced with steel rods. Due to a shortage of timber, bricks or concrete blocks were often used as shuttering. This has led to a common misunderstanding that many pillboxes were only built of brick! Where the shuttering has been removed, the two pouring of concrete often show up as a fault line. In this instance LBC (London Brick Company) bricks were used for the shuttering.
Walking the woods to the rear of Bread And Cheese Lane.
PILLBOX (TYPE FW3/27): S0005060
On the Western edge of Bread and Cheese Lane, North of Hammond Street. Type 27 pillbox. Also one anti-tank block between the pillbox and the road. Concrete-faced, with two metal doors to entrance of AA pit. Faces NNW across valley. Angled edge of roof. Wall of AA position raised about 8ins above level of roof. Octagonal pillbox with attached entrance porch. Pillbox with open central well facing N. Attached exterior blast wall with embrasure. Steel doors to central AA well. Horizontal plank shuttering. Overgrown, but otherwise complete and in good condition. Interior access possible, but full of rubbish.
The entrance to the LAA pit.
ANTI TANK BLOCK: S0016689
NNE of Gammon Farm and outbuildings, fifty yards to West of public footpath. Three anti-tank blocks set in line on a concrete base. One vertical side of the blocks slopes at an angle so they are not strictly of the 'cube' type. Two further brick-shuttered blocks are said to lie to the East of adjacent pillbox.
PILLBOX (TYPE FW3/22): S0005062
Brick-shuttered. Faces NW. Access is difficult as site is on private land and because of surrounding growth.
The two brick shuttered AT blocks.
On the other side of where an AT ditch was located are a further line of AT blocks.
ANTI TANK BLOCK: S0005063
Set along field boundary NW of Appleby Street Farm. 15 anti-tank blocks. Line of anti-tank blocks (at least eight) positioned side by side along hedgerow. 7 blocks cast using corrugated iron shuttering. Probably ex-situ. Viewed from a distance. There is no access to this site without permission.
PILLBOX (TYPE FW3/27): S0000583
In the grounds of Cheshunt Park at the boundary with land of Cheshunt Park Farm. Type 27 pillbox. Faces NE. With steel doors to central well and attached loopholed blast wall. The pillbox is so overgrown a proper inspection is impossible. Having spoken firstly with the farmers wife and directed over to the farmer, i was given permission to look around the area at my own pace. I still got stopped by a farm hand driving a tractor but was allowed to carry on. Access was available to this pillbox via another route but to actually inspect the pillbox at leisure i had to gain the permission needed.
The pillbox was fully sealed. A crudely capped off LAA pit.
Also located around the farm.
ANTI TANK BLOCK: S0012133
Cheshunt Park Farm farmyard, near black barn. Row of 9 anti-tank cubes. Originally there were 10, but the second from the W end has been demolished.PILLBOX (TYPE FW3/27): S0005067
On E side of Park Lane Paradise a few yards N of entrance to Cheshunt Park Farm. Octagonal pillbox with attached entrance porch. Faces NNE. Type 27 pillbox so heavily overgrown it is almost totally hidden. A structure at its centre covered in ivy (perhaps a surround to the central anti-aircraft well) stands higher than the other type 27 examples in the area. No sign of anti-tank blocks close by although this would have been the site of a roadblock.
That concludes this explore that was carried out in June 2012. In the area are other pillboxes but these will be entered into another report on the area.
Thanks for reading the report.
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